The Scramble For Africa's Minerals

Oct 10

Written By j a

Africa holds roughly 30% of the world's critical mineral reserves yet captures less than 5% of the value added from them. That gap, between what lies under African soil and what African economies earn from it, is the backdrop for one of the defining geopolitical contests of the decade. Washington, Brussels, Beijing, Moscow and New Delhi are all competing for cobalt, copper, lithium, rare earths and gold. This time the weapons are less likely to be armies than capital, rail lines, refineries and offtake contracts.

Why have the stakes risen?

The modern economy runs on about 50 minerals that the United States classes as critical to economic and national security. Batteries, semiconductors, wind turbines, missiles and electric vehicles all depend on them, and China dominates the processing of many. For Western governments, Africa offers the most obvious alternative supply. For China, it is the foundation of an existing position it intends to hold. For middle powers such as India, it is a way out of dependence on Beijing. By 2026 analysts describe the shift as one from speculative interest to entrenched resource nationalism. Producer governments have noticed that they hold leverage, and several have started using it.

The United States: deals, finance and rail

Washington's most ambitious play is in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which produces more than 70% of the world's mined cobalt. A strategic partnership agreement signed in December 2025, alongside a US-brokered Congo-Rwanda peace deal, ties American investment to access for US buyers. Since then:

The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) pledged more than $1 billion across two projects and issued a letter of intent for an equity stake.
State miner Gécamines and the trader Mercuria set up a minerals marketing venture, with DFC investment that could give US end users a right of first refusal on copper and cobalt.
In February 2026, the US-backed Orion Critical Mineral Consortium signed a non-binding memorandum to buy 40% of Glencore's Congolese assets, with the right to direct a share of production to nominated buyers.
Kinshasa offered Washington a shortlist of state-owned assets, including the rebel-held Rubaya coltan mine, which produces about 15% of the world's coltan. According to Reuters, one aim was to draw the US into helping recover the area.

The Lobito Corridor, a rail route through Angola, the DRC and Zambia to the Atlantic, is the infrastructure side of the strategy. It would let Congolese and Zambian minerals reach the sea directly. In February 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President JD Vance hosted a Critical Minerals Ministerial that launched FORGE, a successor to the Minerals Security Partnership, and floated a preferential trade zone using price floors and adjustable tariffs.

The push is broadening. At a July forum in Abidjan, US Treasury officials laid out a framework for African value chains, and more recently Washington said it would help Kenya build a minerals processing industry, back a rare earths project in Madagascar, and expand DFC equity investment on the continent.

China: the entrenched incumbent

China's advantage is depth. Chinese companies are deeply embedded in Congolese copper and cobalt, and state-linked firms build infrastructure alongside mines. The clearest example is Simandou in Guinea, a mining, rail and port project reportedly costing $15 to 20 billion and designed to ship up to 120 million tonnes of high-grade iron ore a year. One of its two mining ventures is controlled entirely by Chinese interests, and Baowu has taken operational control. In Zambia, JCHX Mining Management has acquired an 80% stake in the Lubambe copper mine.

Beijing is also using trade policy. Xi Jinping announced in February that from 1 May 2026 China would apply zero tariffs to every African country with which it has diplomatic relations. Law firm Gide notes that Chinese investment is shifting from pure extraction toward downstream industry and energy and transport infrastructure, which matches African governments' wish to process minerals at home. China also refines much of what Africa digs up. South Africa, for example, sends about 95% of its manganese ore to China for refining.

Russia: security for access, with limits

Russia's offer is different: security and state-to-state ties, particularly in the Sahel. Moscow's Africa Corps has backed juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in exchange for access to resources. In Mali, that has meant a Russian-backed gold refinery under construction, support for a lithium project, and nuclear and solar agreements. Analysts at New America argue that refining gold locally also helps Russia work around Western sanctions.

The model proved fragile this spring. After Russia's Africa Corps withdrew from Kidal and Mali's Russia-trained defence minister was killed in a suicide bombing in April, analysts said Russia's image as a reliable security guarantor had been dented, although it was too early to judge whether Moscow would pull out. Russia's mining weight is also modest: the US Geological Survey puts its 2025 rare earth output at 2,600 tonnes, against 270,000 for China.

India: a latecomer hedging its bets

India wants overseas supply to cut its dependence on China, but its record so far is thin. Reuters reported in May that New Delhi had signed critical minerals agreements with Argentina, Australia and Japan, held only one overseas lithium project agreement, and withdrew from a Mali lithium project over security concerns. It was also in advanced talks with Russia on a preliminary pact covering exploration, processing and technology, and might revisit the Mali project if the situation there stabilised. India's most visible moves have been outside Africa, which suggests its African ambitions are still ahead of its footprint.

Africa is not a bystander

Framing Africa as a passive prize misses the point. Governments are bargaining hard, and increasingly they set the terms:

The DRC replaced a cobalt export ban (February to October 2025) with quotas capping exports at 87,000 tonnes a year for 2026 and 2027, roughly half of 2024's monthly average. In June it ordered producers to surrender unused quota, and its regulator says it may cut the cap further. The goal is to build domestic refining, though the country had no active cobalt refining capacity when the system was announced.
Zimbabwe suspended exports of raw minerals and lithium concentrates in February 2026, a decision that arrived without warning. The country had shipped about 1.1 million tonnes of spodumene concentrate to China in 2025.
Namibia and South Africa are pursuing local-ownership and designated-minerals rules, which law firm Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr says US ventures like Project Vault could complicate.

The continental ambition, expressed in Agenda 2063 and the African Mining Vision, is beneficiation: processing minerals at home rather than exporting raw ore and importing finished batteries. The World Bank has warned that resource-rich countries face volatility and governance risks if institutions do not keep pace, and that speed can overtake scrutiny when rivalry is intense.

What to watch

Three questions will decide who wins and who benefits:

Can the West match China's financing and refining base? American and European strategies depend on development finance and offtake diplomacy, but they lack a comparable processing industry for several minerals.
Will deals survive security shocks? Eastern Congo and the Sahel show that the most valuable ground is often the least stable.
Will African states convert leverage into industry? Export bans and quotas raise prices and bargaining power, but they only pay off if processing plants, power and rail follow. Contracts signed before 2026 are already being renegotiated.

The analysts' consensus is that competition expands African governments' options and may encourage a race to the top. Whether it does depends less on the great powers than on whether African states can enforce terms that keep more of the value at home.

Sources

j a